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From Technocrat to Democrat 
 




There is an epistemic argument for judicial deference to the decisions of 
administrative agencies and legislatures: courts do not have easy access 
to relevant information, and they should defer to those who do.  People 
who are steeped in technical issues, and alert to the importance of those 
issues, might well be inclined to embrace judicial modesty.  In 
administrative law, then-Professor Stephen Breyer pioneered the view that 
judge-made doctrines reflect unarticulated assumptions about regulatory 
policy, and he urged that such doctrines could not be evaluated without a 
sense of the underlying substance and the likely human consequences.  In 
light of the complexity of the substance, Breyer argued for a degree of 
modesty.  On the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer has often embraced 
judicial modesty as well, emphasizing the importance and relevance of 
complex judgments of fact (sometimes with the aid of what we might call 
“the Breyer Appendix”).  The principal qualification is his insistence on 
reasoned decision making, which he appears to regard as a quid pro quo 
for deference, as an aspect of the rule of law, and as an indispensable 
check on arbitrariness. 
 
 As a law professor, Justice Breyer’s field was administrative law, where his most 
important contribution was to challenge the view that the exclusive focus of the field 
should be on judicial review of agency action.  On Breyer’s account, it is not possible to 
understand what agencies do, or to evaluate judicial judgments, without having some 
sense of the substance of regulatory policy as well.1  It is not easy to overstate the 
importance of this claim, which has transformed a once-arid field.  
 
Breyer’s great casebook, written with Richard Stewart, is pointedly called not 
Administrative Law, but Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy.2  Originally 
                                                
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. The author is grateful to 
Daniel Kanter for superb research assistance. 
1 This view permeates STEPHEN BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND REGULATORY POLICY (1979). 
2 BREYER & STEWART, supra note. Full disclosure: As a research assistant for Professor 
Stewart, I worked on the book in the late 1970s, and along with Michael Herz and Adrian 
Vermeule, I am a coeditor of the current edition. 
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published in 1979, it lived up to its title.  In area after area, the casebook attempted to 
inform judicial decisions with materials on the substantive problems involved.  It 
pointedly suggested that such decisions cannot be understood in a policy vacuum, and 
that beneath seemingly dry debates about doctrine, courts were often making 
controversial assumptions about complex questions of policy and about the human 
consequences of alternative courses of action.  A careful reader of the casebook might 
well conclude that that those who understand the substance will be inclined to take a 
significantly more cautious approach to review by generalist judges, who should afford 
specialized agencies a large measure of respect.  
 
It is fair to say that as a law professor, Breyer ushered administrative law into the 
modern era.  It is also fair to say that because of his insistence on the importance and 
relevance of substantive questions, he called for a heightened degree of judicial deference 
to democratic processes.3  In administrative law, he was both a technocrat and a democrat 
(in the sense of an advocate for judicial modesty).  Indeed, he was a democrat in 
significant part because he was a technocrat.  This form of judicial humility emerged 
from Breyer’s brand of pragmatism, not from abstractions or high-flown theory. 
 
To be sure, there are multiple potential tensions between a belief in technocracy 
and a belief in democracy. Those tensions lie at the heart of contemporary administrative 
law (and in a sense public law more generally). Technocrats are enthusiastic about a large 
role for insulated, independent experts, immersed in complex questions. Democrats are 
concerned that such experts lack accountability and may have an agenda of their own. If 
we are concerned about fidelity to popular will, we might not be so enthusiastic about 
insulated experts. The potential tension might be defused in various ways, perhaps by 
ensuring ultimate accountability for judgments of policy while creating procedural 
safeguards designed to ensure that technical expertise is in fact being deployed.4  
 
I am bracketing those larger questions here. What I seek to emphasize is that if the 
question is judicial review of regulations and statutes, courts might opt for modesty in 
large part because of an awareness of what judges are unlikely to know. This argument 
for modesty offers one reason why a judge with technocratic inclinations might well be a 
democrat.5 
 
In my view, Breyer’s academic writing, with its close attention to regulatory 
substance, much helps to explain his work on the Supreme Court.  His general respect for 
democratic judgments is, in significant part, epistemic; it stems from an emphasis on the 
importance of the consequences, on the impossibility of evaluating doctrine without a 
                                                
3 Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts’ Role in the Nuclear Energy 
Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978). 
4 Some of these issues are addressed in Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013). 
5 Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2006), offers a host of reasons, as well as a 
distinctive understanding of democratic ideals, but I believe that the epistemic strand in 
his work deserves particular emphasis. 
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sense of those consequences, and on an insistent recognition of what judges do not know.  
There is a lesson here about what makes Justice Breyer’s work distinctive, even unique.  
We might speak here of “the Breyer Appendix,” a worthy successor to the Brandeis 
Brief, in which Justice Breyer accompanies his opinions with an appendix citing a range 
of technical materials.6   
 
There is also a lesson about the possibility of a distinctly epistemic argument for 
judicial deference, one that involves the limits of judicial knowledge of fact, and that (in 
my view) deserves a far larger role in constitutional law and jurisprudence than it now 
occupies.7 This argument is very different from those of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
captured in his famous words: “If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell, I will help them. 
It’s my job.”8 Breyer is also interested in judicial humility, but not at all because he wants 
to assist his fellow citizens in going to Hell. On the contrary, his belief in humility is 
rooted in a belief that good outcomes are more likely if judges play a modest role in the 
constitutional order. 
 
We can find the core of the idea in his short essay on the Vermont Yankee case, 
which repays careful reading, even though it was published over twenty-five years ago.9  
Breyer wrote in the midst of a heated doctrinal debate over whether courts should be 
allowed to require agencies to adopt more procedures than the Administrative Procedure 
Act mandates.10  Characteristically, and somewhat oddly for the time, Breyer stepped 
back from the narrow doctrinal debates and asked more broadly about the role of the 
courts in the controversy over nuclear power.  He objected that judges are “intruding too 
deeply upon the administrative process, perhaps without full realization of their implicit 
premises or of the potential consequences.”11  In making this argument, he emphasized 
the importance of “the ‘substantive’ issues in the case,” which he engaged in detail.12  In 
good realist fashion, he suggested that  “in practice, the reviewing standards courts apply 
often reflect unarticulated assumptions about, or attitudes toward, the substantive aspects 
of the subject matter being reviewed.”13  
                                                
6 See, e.g., Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2771–79 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Eldred v. Ashcroft , 537 U.S. 186, 267–69 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 631–44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 996 (1998) (Breyer, J. dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
7 The closest account may be ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006). 
8 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS 248, 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
9 See Breyer, supra note.  
10 See Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative 
Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978); Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the 
Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1823 (1978). 
11 Breyer, supra note, at 1833. 




Steeping himself in that substance, he insisted that “potentially adverse health, 
safety, or environmental effects lie not on one side, but on all sides, of the nuclear power 
issue.”14  It followed that “application of a more stringent standard of review means delay 
and favors the status quo,” with delay turning out not to be irrelevant or innocuous, but 
significantly affecting “the outcome of the energy debate.”15  In the 1970s, federal courts 
had treated nuclear power as posing unique dangers, but the “most recent comparison of 
the health and safety effects of coal and nuclear energy suggests that coal plants are likely 
to cause seven to twelve times as many deaths as nuclear plants, and four to six times as 
much sickness and injury.”16  In what may well be the first prominent reference to 
climate change in the legal literature, he added that reliance on coal “could aggravate the 
‘greenhouse effect,’ whereby excess carbon dioxide (which accompanies coal burning) 
traps heat inside the earth's atmosphere, thus possibly melting the icecaps and raising the 
level of the oceans.”17  With these points, Breyer drew attention to the problem of 
“health-health tradeoffs” and its relationship to administrative law.18 
 
Breyer also explored the consequences of court-imposed delays, which, he said, 
“are not ‘neutral.’  They affect the decisionmaking process, tending to move the decisions 
of those who actually build power plants in the direction of coal, which may well prove 
more hazardous and environmentally destructive than nuclear plants.”19  This point was 
poorly understood at the time, and it is not sufficiently appreciated today, because those 
who stress doctrinal requirements, and the importance of judicial safeguards, tend to miss 
the systemic effects of judicial invalidations and remands.20  Breyer’s support for the 
Court’s conclusion in Vermont Yankee was based on his judgment, rooted in a sense of 
the likely consequences, that courts “should play a limited role, affecting as little as 
possible the outcome of that debate.  Judges, after all, are neither elected representatives 
nor experts in energy technology.”21 
 
It is revealing that Breyer’s principal academic writings in the general area of 
administrative law deal with substance and real-world effects, not procedure and 
doctrine.  Regulation and its Reform22 emphasizes the need to “match” market failures 
(such as externalities) with particular tools (such as Pigouvian taxes); it contends that a 
principal source of regulatory problems is “mismatch” between failure and tool.  With 
that claim, the book helped to reorient administrative law teachers from their standard 
                                                
14 Id. at 1835. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1836. 
18 For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1533 (1996). 
19 Breyer, supra note, at 1840. 
20 A classic treatment is JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
21 Breyer, supra note, at 1845. 
22 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). 
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preoccupation with the appropriate intensity of judicial review.  In Breaking the Vicious 
Circle, Breyer contends that the United States government devotes excessive resources to 
small problems and insufficient resources to large ones.23  He argues that a cadre of 
experts, schooled in technical matters, should have the authority to ensure that scarce 
dollars are doing the most good.24 
 
These books do not much engage the question of the judicial role, but they have a 
great deal of continuity with Justice Breyer’s opinions on the Court, which also 
emphasize the importance of facts and the human consequences.  His frequent votes in 
favor of validating the outcomes of democratic processes, resisting occasional trends 
toward heightened judicial scrutiny,25 reflect the epistemic case for judicial modesty.   
 
I will offer some details shortly, but we should begin with an obvious puzzle.  
One might expect that Justice Breyer would be the Court’s most enthusiastic defender of 
the Chevron principle, which requires courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations 
of law in the face of statutory ambiguity.26  One defense of Chevron is precisely that 
agencies have technical expertise and should be allowed to apply that expertise to resolve 
ambiguities.27  Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Breyer has, in fact, been the Court’s most 
consistent critic of Chevron, contending that its approach is far too simple and rule-like, 
and that the appropriate degree of deference should turn on a multifactor balancing test.28  
Is it possible to square his skepticism about Chevron with his embrace of judicial 
modesty? 
 
For two reasons, I believe that it is.  First, Justice Breyer wholeheartedly 
embraces Chevron when technical expertise is involved,29 in the sense that it bears on 
resolution of statutory ambiguities.  For this reason, he embeds a recognition of technical 
expertise into his preferred framework -- though in my view, his call for a multifactor test 
produces undue complexity in the law and creates a risk of judicial overreaching.30  But 
second, and more importantly, Justice Breyer has been found, in a large data set, to be the 
                                                
23 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993). 
24 Id. at. 
25 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2761 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
26 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
27 The Court referred to that point in Chevron itself.  Id. at 865. 
28 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363 (1986).  The same essential view can be found in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 
212 (2002), as well as Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 
133 S.Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
29 See Breyer, supra note. 
30 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 247–49 (2006). 
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most deferential justice on the Court.31  Ironic but true: the Court’s most vocal critic of a 
strong reading of Chevron is the most deferential Justice in practice, while Justice Scalia, 
the Court’s most vocal Chevron enthusiast, is the least deferential.32  
 
More particularly, Justice Breyer voted to uphold agency interpretations 82 
percent of the time, whereas Justice Scalia did so merely 52 percent of the time.33  Also 
remarkably, Justice Breyer’s validation votes did not depend on whether the sitting 
President is Republican or Democratic.34  He voted to uphold the interpretations of 
Republican administrations 80 percent of the time – and thus showed no statistically 
significant difference between Republican and Democratic administrations.35  By 
contrast, Justice Scalia voted to uphold the interpretations of Republican administrations 
60.5 percent of the time but Democratic administrations just 42 percent of the time – a 
striking difference.36 
 
If we put the numbers to one side and investigate Justice Breyer’s opinions, we 
will see that he is often concerned to investigate and to muster facts, sometimes 
appearing in the body of his opinions, sometimes appearing in technical appendices.  
Who else, for example, would write the following sentence: “With the assistance of the 
Supreme Court Library, I have compiled these two appendixes listing peer-reviewed 
academic journal articles on the topic of psychological harm resulting from playing 
violent video games.”37  It is noteworthy that the two appendices come in an opinion 
calling for judicial deference to a legislative decision to prohibit the sale or rental of 
violent video games to minors.38  In arguing for such deference, Justice Breyer 
emphasized that many or most of the peer-reviewed “articles were available to the 
California Legislature or the parties in briefing this case. . . . And consequently, these 
studies help to substantiate the validity of the original judgment of the California 
Legislature, as well as that judgment’s continuing validity.”39  
 
The modern era of occasional judicial scrutiny of congressional authority began 
with United States v. Lopez,40 where the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
                                                
31 Thomas Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006).  This data set includes all 
relevant decisions from 1989 through 1995.  To be sure, it would be most valuable to 
examine the evidence to the present day. 
32 Id. at 832 tbl.1. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 874 app. tbl.1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 833, 879 app. tbl.1.  
37 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2771 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
38 See id. at 2770. 
39 Id. at 2772. 
40 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 7 
facts, contending, “Numerous reports and studies—generated both inside and outside 
government—make clear that Congress could reasonably have found the empirical 
connection that its law, implicitly or explicitly, asserts.”41  Among other things, he 
pointed to “evidence that, today more than ever, many firms base their location decisions 
upon the presence, or absence, of a work force with a basic education,”42 and that “a 
widespread, serious, and substantial physical threat to teaching and 
learning also substantially threatens the commerce to which that teaching and learning is 
inextricably tied.”43  He also offered a lengthy appendix, complete with a list of 
congressional materials, other materials from the federal government, and a host of 
associated writing, with empirical papers from the American Economic Review, the 
Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of 
the American Medical Association.44 
 
In the area of “substantial evidence” review, the Court’s most important opinion 
in recent decades is Allentown Mack Sales and Services, Inc. v. NLRB,45 where the 
majority gave unusually careful scrutiny to a decision of the National Labor Relations 
Board, striking it down for lack of sufficient evidentiary support.  In dissent, Justice 
Breyer made a characteristic set of objections, emphasizing agency expertise and 
contending that “words of a technical sort that the Board has used in hundreds of 
opinions . . . have suddenly disappeared, leaving in their place what looks like an 
ordinary jury standard that might reflect, not an agency's specialized knowledge of the 
workplace, but a court's common understanding of human psychology.”46  Stressing the 
agency’s  “accumulated expertise,”47 he objected that the majority had substituted “its 
own judgment for that of the Board and the ALJ in respect to such detailed workplace-
related matters.”48 
 
Justice Breyer offered closely related arguments in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.,49 in which he dissented from the Court’s decision to invalidate the FDA’s 
assertion of authority over tobacco products.  In explaining his dissent, he drew attention 
to the agency’s “broad jurisdictional authority”50 and pointed to changing understandings 
of facts over time: he noted that “such a statutory delegation of power could lead after 
many years to an assertion of jurisdiction that the 1938 legislators might not have 
expected.  Such a possibility is inherent in the very nature of a broad delegation.”51 
 
                                                
41 Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. at 621. 
43 Id. at 622–23. 
44 Id. at 636–44. 
45 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
46 Id. at 390 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
47 Id. at 393. 
48 Id. at 394. 
49 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
50 Id. at 165 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 166. 
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But there is an important exception to Justice Breyer’s usual posture of deference, 
and it involves the duty of reasoned decision making.  He appears to find that duty to be 
part of the rule of law, and he insists on its exercise as a kind of quid pro quo for 
deference.  We can find the central idea in his relatively rare votes to strike down acts of 
Congress and also to invalidate federal regulations. 
 
Consider, for example, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion from the Court’s 
decision to uphold Congress’ twenty-year extension of the copyright term.52  He 
emphasized not only that this was “the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s 
founding,” but more fundamentally its “practical effect,” which is to inhibit rather than to 
promote the progress of science. 53  In explaining this conclusion, Justice Breyer offered a 
technical appendix, relying on a brief from economist George Akerlof and his coauthors 
to support the view that his “text’s estimates of the economic value of 1998 Act 
copyrights relative to the economic value of a perpetual copyright, as well as the 
incremental value of a 20-year extension of a 75-year term, rest upon the conservative 
future value and discount rate assumptions set forth in the brief of economist amici.”54 
 
Insistence on the duty of reasoned decision making also helps to account for 
Justice Breyer’s refusal to join the majority opinion upholding the FCC’s change in its 
policy with respect to the use of “fleeting expletives” on the airwaves.  In FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc.,55 his objection was simply that the FCC did not give a sufficient 
explanation for its change, which would allow it to punish stations for allowing such 
expletives.  In his view, the agency’s explanation lacked “empirical or other information” 
to justify its new conclusion.56  Invoking the requirement of reasoned decision making, 
he suggested that “FCC’s answer to the question, ‘Why change?’ is, ‘We like the new 
policy better.’  This kind of answer, might be perfectly satisfactory were it given by an 
elected official.  But when given by an agency, in respect to a major change of an 
important policy where much more might be said, it is not sufficient.”57 
 
The most important point here is that an agency may not defend its policy simply 
by asserting its preference.  It has to offer reasons.  To be sure, there is a risk that a 
judicial demand for reasoned decision making will serve, in practice, as a judicial 
demand for reasons with which judges agree.  In FCC v. Fox Television, the FCC did not 
merely assert its preferences; it attempted to explain them, and for that reason, there is a 
strong argument that the majority was right.58  Nonetheless, a requirement of reason-
                                                
52 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 243. 
54 Id. at 267. 
55 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
56 Id. at 567 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 517–18 (majority opinion) (citing In the Matter of Complaints Regarding Various 
Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 
(2006)) (cataloguing the FCC’s justifications for its decision). 
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giving can be seen as an effort to ensure that technical expertise is in fact being applied, 
and that agencies are not merely bowing to political winds.59  
 
 Justice Breyer has been on the Court for over a quarter-century.  In that period, 
his thinking has not so much changed as broadened.  Once focused principally on 
administrative law and regulatory policy, he is now concerned with issues of 
constitutional theory and self-governance.  But he continues to emphasize the importance 
of immersion in the facts; he continues to defend a modest judicial role.  More than any 
Justice in the Court’s history, he remains a technocrat, and he is a democrat, emphasizing 
the importance of judicial humility, in part for that reason.   
 
Let’s allow him the final words (and note the contrast with Holmes’ very different 
suggestion about where he would help his fellow citizens to go): “I suggest that by 
understanding that its actions have real-world consequences and taking those 
consequences into account, the court can help make the law work more effectively and 









                                                
59 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51. 
60 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW, at xiv (2010). 
